more complex than the original one.
The ontogeny of the Piaroa, a people of the Venezuelan rainforest, rehearses a similar story about the origin of the world as the result of a cannibalistic battle between two antagonistic forces, brothers-in-law that fight until they devour each other. In this way, all of the differences in the world gained form during a mythic time of cumulative history and extreme creativity. This extremely creative power, however, poisoned the life of the senses of the beings on earth. To make life on earth possible, the Piaroa adopted an ethics and aesthetics of conservation instead of accumulation, a history that works to keep things in place and avoid the return of uncontrolled creative forces and their autodestructive and poisonous potential (Overing, 1986b (Overing, , 1989 (Overing, , 1990 .
The origin myth of the Yanomami similarly meditates on the dangers of uncontrolled productive desires that give rise to people with 'minds planted in merchandise'. Minerals were planted by Omama, the creator god. Like the bones of a skeleton, they sustain the earth. The peccary people, as the Yanomami call the gold miners and their digging equipment, put this delicate geological construction in danger, releasing the lethal smoke of metal that carries the deadly epidemics that afflict the inhabitants of the forest and their shamans.
Through their songs and dances, shamans keep the xapiri image-beings that animate the forest alive. When the last shaman dies, the xapiri will become enraged and cause the sky to fall upon the earth (Kopenawa & Albert, 2010) . Davi Kopenawa's story about the dangers of the end of the world is a good example of what Elizabeth Povinelli calls a 'geontology' and the cosmopo-136 copernicus in the amazon: ontological turnings from the perspective of amerindian ethnologies sociol. antropol. | rio de janeiro, v.08.01: 133 -167, jan.-apr., 2018 litical agencies necessary to keep geological formations in place. Different geontologies think differently the relation between life and nonlife, such as rocks, stones, creeks, and the desert. By emphasising nonlife, Povinelli points toward the limits of an evident vitalist tendency in the literature on different relational ontologies, which ponder life in terms of a constant process of engendering, being born, growing and dying. "For the animist everything has life", says Povinelli in her interview. But, for the Aborigines, the landscape of the Australian desert is the outcome of events and acts that happened to the ancestors in the past; though it is nonlife or landscape, it nonetheless needs a relational network of reflection and intentional actions, of strategies that enable the rocks or creeks to continue to exist. "I am the analytic subject asking, 'how, in the world I am in, do I keep myself in place?' and that is absolutely not the typical anthropological concept of the other" (Povinelli, 2014) .
As an alternative, Povinelli proposes the concept of the 'otherwise'. "The otherwise is that which is within something and causes that thing to shake and the whole system to turn into something else" (Povinelli, 2014) . Instead of the 'other as other' in opposition to a 'we', framing the otherwise as being internal to an 'us' enables minorities to act within majorities and to thereby transform them.
This idea comes surprisingly close to the Amerindian definition of otherness, whereby 'self' and 'other' are intrinsically intertwined and traversed by processes of other-self-becoming or becoming-otherwise (Lagrou, 1998) . Every person is the result of a complex bricolage of different agencies acting together, in such a way that a collectivity of beings or their habitat can remain in continuity with what it was before, without thus negating the incidence of forces that change it.
'Nature' for Amerindians is constant variation; to be alive is to improvise with the means at hand in the creative invention of everyday life (Wagner, 1975 ).
An eloquent example of this mode of being are the Pirahã, who always experiment, producing miniatures that seek to emulate or look like other things and beings. They thereby follow the example of Igagai, the creator, who produced the animals, moulding them from mud and improvising in the process, working through resemblances and differences. The world is not only composed of successful experiments, but also of predatory events, failed cannibalizations. New human bodies, for instance, are conceived by a fright caused in a woman by an unsuccessful predatory act. And a new image-being 6 , 'spirit' or 'god', abaisi, is born when a human body suffers an accident caused by another agent and liberates a double as a result. The world is in a constant process of creating forms and images in interaction with and reaction to each other (Gonçalves, 2001) .
THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF A CONCEPT
Until recently, for my ethnologist colleagues in Brazil and I, the ontological turn had been the given Ground against which we have been shaping our Figures.
Each one of us has been searching for an idiom that comes as close as possible to Mythologiques (Taylor, 2011) .
In the 1970s, in his important book Society against the State, Clastres made explicit his ambition to provoke a 'Copernican revolution' in the political thought of the metropolis: instead of thinking of the native peoples of the Americas along with the sixteenth century chroniclers, who saw them as peoples 'without faith, without law, and without king' -that is as people who lacked political organization, or society tout court, since they were not organized through the State -Clastres sought to turn political philosophy on its head. We know the influence that this idea had on the writings of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) :
A Copernican revolution is at stake, in the sense that in some respects, ethnology until now has let primitive cultures revolve around Western civilization in a centripetal motion, so to speak. Political anthropology appears to have made it abundantly clear that a complete reversal of perspectives is necessary. Political anthropolog y encounters a limit that is not so much a property of primitive societies as it is something carried within anthropology itself, the limitation of the West itself, whose seal is still engraved upon it. In order to escape the attraction of its native earth […] ref lection on power must effect a 'heliocentric' conversion: it will then perhaps succeed in better understanding the world of others, and consequently our own.
The path of its conversio'n is shown, moreover, by a contemporary mind that has been able to take seriously that of Savages: the work of Claude Levi-Strauss [...] It is time to change suns, time to move on (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 25-26) Almost ten years ago, in a comparative essay on Amerindian arts and artefacts, inspired by Gell's Art and agency, by Clastres' and Lévi-Strauss's contributions to a non-representationalist approach to images and artefacts, by Viveiros de Castro's perspectivism, as well as by the writings of Joanna
Overing, I wrote on art as a way of giving form to thought, of producing life and bodies. Motivated by the image of the inversion of perspectives, I followed
Clastres in his use of the Copernican metaphor:
138 copernicus in the amazon: ontological turnings from the perspective of amerindian ethnologies sociol. antropol. | rio de janeiro, v.08.01: 133 -167, jan.-apr., 2018 In this book we explored the theoretical consequences of an ethnological perspective on Amerindian arts. The specificity of this perspective resides in not taking as a point of reference any of the previously available definitions of art, be these aesthetic, interpretive or institutional. We thus envisage a Copernican revolution for art, equivalent to the one effected by Pierre Clastres for politics
[…] By looking at our own society with Amerindian collectives as a reference point, the criteria of evaluation necessarily change.
[…] If we look at art as an art of building worlds, and no longer as a phenomenon to be distinguished from the artefact -as a sphere of practice associated with the extraordinary, that needs to be kept apart from the everyday in order to keep its sacredness -the cognitive relation is inverted. This figure and ground reversal reveals a new figure, a new ground. Nothing in the form, or sense or context of things predisposes them to be classified as art or not art. In this way, works of art can be human bodies sculpted by ritual intervention, through ritual song and medicinal baths, dieting and a more properly physical moulding (which may consist of different techniques of producing a body/person deemed 'beautiful'; aesthetics is ethical uprightness).
The result is that the body becomes a conceptual artefact and the artefact an almost-body, and that the trajectories of bodies and artefacts increasingly converge. Another result is that functionality and contemplation become inseparable; aesthetic efficacy results from the capacity of an image to act upon and thus create and transform the world. If art, our own and that of others, continues to fascinate, it is because we can never cease to dream up the possibility of creating new worlds. This possibility of coexistence and superimposition of different worlds which are not mutually exclusive is a lesson we have yet to learn from Amerindian art (Lagrou, 2014:104-105 proposes that the turn's ambition must be to "invert, turn, the relation between ethnographic materials and analytical resources on its head. Ethnography thus becomes the source of our concepts, not the object" (Holbraad, 2016) . (Clifford, 1981 (Clifford, , 1988 .
We ethnologists know fully well that our Northern colleagues, as well as our non-ethnologist colleagues at home, used to think that the ethnological style of doing anthropology was 'traditional', and that this ambition of getting close to the conceptual skin of the natives (in the Malinowskian sense) was long due a thorough deconstruction. But it appears to me that the ontological Though it perceives itself as human, the capuchin monkey is an animal for the Yudjá. The night monkey, in contrast, is more spirit than animal. The difference between to be and to have a spirit or soul is crucial for the Yudjá, as indeed it is for the Huni Kuin (Cashinahua). But the Yudjá go one step further: in the diffuse or contiguous zone of animals that can be human, and humans and animals that can be spirits, the humans possess the moral privilege of reflexivity. Only humans know that the world is characterized by the duplicity of all beings, so that the subject never knows its double. This is an interesting psychological theory, and the Yudjá theory of subjectification contains an important asymmetry: This 'non-reciprocity of perspectives', as Gonçalves (2001) called it when referring to a similar phenomenon among the Pirahã, differs from the more widespread character of perspectivism, where the symmetrically inverse quality of the relations between the human and nonhuman point of view is empha-
sized. An example of this last logic can be found among the Wari described by Vilaça (1992) and Conklin (2001) . Here, when a subject, the hunter, imposes his point of view upon another, the point of view of the Other disappears: as game, the Other becomes the object of the action of a Subject, in an agent/patient inversion similar to that proposed by Alfred Gell for the agency of objects in his
Art and agency. Accordingly, the self-designation of the Wari means 'predator'. Instead of a substantive quality, these self-designations share a pronominal unity. Thus huni kuin means 'we', displaying all of the contextual amplitude of similar pronominal categories. In its more restricted acceptation, it can be applied to those speaking the same language and living together; in its wider sense, it can refer to 'all indigenous people living in the forest'. The Cashinahua are thus no different from their neighbours, the Ashaninka/Campa and Piro/Yine. By declaring that they want to be called huni kuin by others (as they indeed do, in the newly defined political context of inter-ethnic relations), they insist on having these others call them: 'we, the people' (Viveiros de Castro, 2012, cites Gow, 2001 for the Piro).
What differs (and difference is crucial here) for the Amerindian ontologies under discussion, is the body "as an assemblage of affects or ways of being that indians think (Overing, 1977) . In the 1970s and 1980s, American ethnologists such as Joanna Overing and Christopher Crocker criticized Lévi-Strauss for over-stressing the metaphorical and totemic logic of indigenous thought. They drew attention to the need to take into account the metonymical aspects of enunciations such as the renowned Bororo claim that "my brother is a parrot" (Crocker, 1977) .
Feminist thought also had an impact on the nature/culture debate, as evident in
Overing's critique of Lévi-Strauss's association of women with nature and her demonstration of the fact that nothing in Amerindian thought about procreation can be considered given or thoughtless; for the Piaroa of Venezuela, conception and gestation, for example, are products of women's thoughts (Overing, 1986a) .
Based on extended fieldwork among the Achuar that resulted in his book
La nature domestique (1986), Descola has sought to overcome the limits of the opposition between Nature and Culture inherited from Lévi-Strauss. The first article in which he reintroduces the concept of animism was published in 1992.
In this article, Descola opposes two schemes for the objectification of nature that he, at the time, termed 'animistic' and 'totemic'. In his next article on the topic, Descola (1996) terms, we are dealing with deictic and pronominal, rather than substantivist notions of nature and culture. That is why, according to Viveiros de Castro (1998: 474) , both opponents and defenders of the nature/culture binary were wrong: Ingold (1991; showed how schemes of analogical projection or social mo- These modes of identification are polyvalent, universal dispositions that "come to have a public existence in the form of ontologies that favour one or another of them as the principle according to which the regime of existing beings is organized" (Descola, 2013: 247) .
Despite this initial overlap of thought processes, the differences between The need to think nature differently, as Gaia, a living being that has begun to react against its destruction by the anthropocene, brought together traditions with very different affiliations that have all been labelled as belonging to the 'ontological turn'. As Foucault once said, "perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian" (Foucault, 1970) . Perhaps Deleuze's approach is in fact the only one able to produce an encounter between all these different 14 It is my conviction that the only way to do this is by using the appropriate poetics, the appropriate aesthetics, because it is through aesthetics, song and 'twisted images' that the natives themselves deal with nonhumans. Equivocation is as crucial to the theory of knowledge professed by Amerindians as it is for anthropologists. One has to consider the space left uncovered by our efforts at translation, which remains open to experimentation. Once we enter the domain of aesthetics it is clear that the famous Batesonian framing of play and poetry becomes central: the play of suggesting without revealing, of equivocal images, visual puns (Bateson, 1955 (Bateson, , 1972 . This is the mind-set surrealist artists recognized in Amerindian art (Carpenter, 1970; Gamboni, 2013; Lagrou, 2008) . And Amerindians certainly do not confuse different states of being, since, as we will see, it would be fatal to perceive an image-being as an animal who takes the human himself to be the animal.
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THE POETICS AND AESTHETICS OF OTHER BECOMING
The Huni Kuin provide yet another turning to the symmetrical inversion of perspectives. As the Yudjá discussed above, they recognize a difference between having and being a spirit. Some animals are humans from their own point of view, which means that they have a 'soul', yuxin. But some animals are yuxin, 'spirit beings.' Yuxin are beings or perceptual phenomena marked by an ambiguity deriving from their capacity to transform. Encountered at dusk, always when the victim is alone, these yuxin announce their presence by mimicking the sound of animals. The hunter thinks he is following his prey, but he is actually becoming prey of an image-being, master of the transformation of form. An encounter with a yuxin is thus confirmed after the fact by its effects. The hunter feels very weak, faints or falls ill, barely managing to return home. In the worst case scenario, he does not return at all, and slowly starts to adopt the point of view, affects and physicality of the yuxin being who captured him.
Yuxin, image-beings, are responsible for most illnesses, which are caused by their attempts to capture human souls and lock them into new bodies, those once possessed by their animal doubles. They are particularly dangerous for young hunters who kill male animals, which then take revenge by means of their doubles, their yuxin. Different kinds of game produce nisun. Nisun is a dizziness and headache, and when it is particularly acute it can lead to fainting.
Huni Kuin shamanism consists in actively seeking encounters with these yuxin beings and successfully counteracting the negative effects they have on human embodied souls when they remain unknown and invisible. To feel dizziness when under the effect of ayahuasca and tobacco is a first step in obtaining the knowledge of what the body spirit of an animal can do to one's eye-soul.
The Huni Kuin use what can be called 'perspectival plants'. When in liquid
form, these plants can be used as eye drops or ingested. They change a human's perceptual world, allowing him or her to adopt the point of view of other beings.
15
Yuxin do not need these perception shifters, for they control the forms to be seen.
The master of all yuxin is Yube, the anaconda. He is the owner of the potent ayahuasca brew, considered to be his blood. Visionary experiences under the effects of the brew are important cosmopolitical events and can be described as real aesthetic battlefields where yuxin beings throw images, ornaments and designs onto the eye-soul of humans who enter their realm. The ritual singer responds through powerful 'song lines' that become lines of vision to be followed by the eye-souls of those who are in trouble. People take the brew in order to see. The
following extract of a song shows the eye soul being covered in Yube's cloths: To see and to be seen depends on an eminently relational quality that is never given. What the Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa has said of the xapiri spirit-helpers also holds true for Yube, the anaconda spirit of the Huni Kuin, and his revelation of his world of image-beings: to see these image-beings it is necessary to first be seen by them. They look at you and thus become visible for you (Kopenawa & Albert, 2010) . To see xapiri one needs to become one of them and see with their eyes. In the same way, to see Yube and his transformational world, you need to see through his eyes. It is therefore not enough to ingest his soul-substance, the visionary vine, index of his agency inside your body. Yube, the anaconda spirit, can decide not to look at you, not to show himself to you; to show only 'lies' or simply show you nothing at all. The process of anaconda-becoming, a condition for obtaining visionary capacities, is not evident at all -besides being a very risky enterprise.
To be devoured by Yube is at once intensely longed for, and terribly fright- The song, in other words, traces paths to be followed by the lost eye-soul of the person suffering. The eye-soul has to follow the design of the song as it unfolds before his eyes in order to be able to come back, to come close to the body of the one who sings, and hence to return to his own body. This is the reason why the master of song will lean against the shivering body of the one lost in the world of images, and sing in the plural voice of Yube, anaconda spirit, that we, I, you miss your body. xawã bani teskarã ai e macaw's peach palm straw ai e
In the vine song this is how we call peccary's fur. Because, if one eats male peccary, one has to call this way, in order not to faint. You call peccary's fur and remove it. Palm straw. You were already wearing peccary cloth.
Afterwards remove it, they are saying.
ha kama puanã ai e his big fur on his back ai e tseka beirãxuma ai e remove it, carrying ai e bene siu pusinã ai e testicle of male peccary, remove it from inside
In order not to become ill you have to remove all the poison of the peccary's substance in order not to faint.
há tsius tameni ai e it's stuck way inside ai e tseka beirã xuma ai e remove his penis ai e xawã kuni henerã ai e took macaw electric fish soup ai e ha naxun apakin ai e poured it here inside my belly ai e pae bua kaia ai e it is already taking its strength away the electric fish gave a shock to the vine, who is withdrawing 152 copernicus in the amazon: ontological turnings from the perspective of amerindian ethnologies sociol. antropol. | rio de janeiro, v.08.01: 133 -167, jan.-apr., 2018 We are dealing with an aesthetic battlefield where the roles of prey and predator have been inverted in venatic and also in sexual terms. My teachers explained to me that in 'vine language' you never call the animal spirit or his owner by his everyday name. What we see is an imagistic description of what these doubles are doing to the person. It is as if the eye-soul got lost in a world of image-beings where it became trapped. The song, with its complex enunciator, at once we, he and you, is coming to the rescue. The eye-soul itself does not sing. The singer is thus the interpreter while the other is the perceiver.
Huni Kuin ontology, as it is unveiled through the analysis of the huni ritual, 
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We are here in the same shamanic universe where, as Taussig (1993) learned, to see and to know is to partially 'become other'. To my knowledge,
Taussig was one of the first authors to associate vision with processes of otherbecoming, relying more on Walter Benjamin's optical unconscious and mimetic capacity than on the Deleuzian concept of becoming. The idea that the point of view is located in the body implies that vision is a tactile engagement withseeing and being seen. The eye touches and is encompassed by the surfaces it explores. To know and to see involve a far-reaching process of other-becoming (Taussig, 1993) .
Marilyn Strathern (2013) (Gallois, 1988) . For the Huni Kuin, the lines that compose their designs are pathways to be followed by the eye-soul; they are the lines of song that form a soundscape, and one elderly lady told me that their design system, kene, is the language of the Yuxin beings (kene yuxinin hantxaki). The network of lines transmits waves and potencies, and is composed of paths to be followed by image-beings familiar to and perceived by those who are prepared for it. Similarly, for the Yudjá patterns on the skin are paths that connect the living to the dead, and this is the reason why one should not use design when mourning (Lima, 1996) . In the subsequent section, I undertook a highly situated archaeology of the key concepts of the ontological turn and of how this discussion turns on the crucial question of the relation between the twin concepts of 'nature' and 'culture', and of how to overcome or redefine both relation and terms.
In the last section, I showed how our theories can be further refined and developed through very specific and precise ethnographic exegeses that takes native philosophical language seriously. As is well known to specialists, Amer- It is my conviction that we will only progress in understanding these complex ontologies if we take aesthetics seriously. We need in-depth studies of specific ontologies that can reveal the complexity and diversity of Indigenous thought, and can put us on the road to understanding 'alternative' as well as 11 See, for example, Goldman's focus on the relations between indigenous and afro-Brazilian collectives and on symmetrical anthropology (Goldman, 2015 (Goldman, , 2016 .
12 Stolze Lima (1999a: 637) remembers she came up with the idea of 'point of view' because it offered an alternative, enabling her "to take a certain distance with respect to the ethnological problem of predation that was so important at the time for my colleagues and supervisor". "But", she concludes, "the notion that the ground is war, cannibalism, death and power, never abandoned me". For the importance of this encompassing ground of cosmological predation for article | els lagrou the delineation of a precarious figure of freedom and peace conquered by human collectives, see Overing (1986b) .
13 See Strathern (1999) for an elaboration on the similarities and differences between her use of the concept of perspective in the Melanesian context and the concept of perspectivism proposed by Viveiros de Castro for Amerindian thought.
14 For an attempt to do exactly this, to distinguish the different theoretical currents gathered under the name ontological turn, see Holbraad & Pedersen (2016) . 
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Abstract
In this article I explore the ontological turn in anthropological theory through three interconnected approaches. 
